But then Scoble makes the point that some companies just concentrate on getting customers and miss out on the shows. iLike (30millin users) and PosiMotion (50,000 downloads a day to iPhones, most of which earn a fee) are tigers which just concentrate on customer engagement and keep their Equity Fingerprint’s and business plan, nice and simple.
So where will the Tigers at CEC9 go? Hope that they not extinct by next year!
In her talk at a meeting at Lancster University Management School (when will it be re-named Lancaster Business School?), Samanthan outlined her work on researching the portfolio of investments made by the N W Brown Group, now IQ Capital Partners. She has been allowed acess to all the confidential information and so is only able to produce summaries of her data. Most interesting was a graph which related to Equity Fingerprint. But whilst Equity Fingerprint concentrates on the decisions made by entrepreneurs in raising fund and how it impacts on their ownership of the company, Samantha’s graph showed the total funing of each round from equity, loan and grants – it showed the gearing achieved by the entrepreneurs on the funds raised. It would be good to incorporate a measure of the change in valuation at each stage. I also suggested that she showed the number of founders at each round as it appears that most Active Equity Companies have three or more founderswhich is very different from Passive Equity Companies which have fewer than three founders.
Of course the sample reflects the types of team which will approach a relatively small player in theUK funding and not the entrepreneurs who will chose other routes such as a trade investment, angels or VCs.
Would a study across the funding groups show that entrepreneurs who take a specific route – customer funding to VC – be significantly more successful than companies following the IQ Capital Partners route or taking investment from Cambridge Enterprise? Or should we stop studying and get on with building business?
Scott Dunn was founded in 1986 and organises luxury holidays. 70 people work in London and Chichester and 185 overseas. The staff travel for four weeks each year checking out the best places – it is quality with a price to match.
In 1991, Peter Stephens became chairman and invested £10,000 in return for a 10% stake in the company – valuing the business at £100k
In 1992, Scott Dunn almost hit the buffers from the force of the first Gulf Way, rise in fuel prices and a drop in the value of sterling. Eight friends stepped in with £40,000 for 1% of the business each valuing the business at some £500,000. The friends were also promised free holidays for five years. This was probably worth more than their investment so the company was valued at £nil but this arrangement did reduce the dilution to Andrew Dunn, Peter Stephens and the original investor so a smart move.
With turnover now at £22million this looks like a shrewd investment and the lucky eight must be able to afford a Scott Dunn holiday now that their freebies are over! Scott Dunn would make an interesting Equity Fingerprint, the business plan resource, and it would be interesting to know if there is a share option scheme for the 70 + 185 staff or whether the chance to test the resorts is sufficient. Andrew Dunn has done (sorry) well to retain a majority shareholding but for how much longer will the other investors be locked in. He is only 44yrs old with a young family so it could be more (un)happy angels!
Image via Wikipedia I have been searching the CEC9 website for a list of the “Tiger” companies which will be on show but could not find any details.![Reblog this post [with Zemanta]](http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=eb6d29e3-4528-4f42-8f41-d3c5b2889ad5)
